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Brain Research and Neuroethics
Abstract
In the past year "neuroethics" has begun to command the attention of neuroscientists, ethicists and journalists.
Ethical questions associated with new knowledge of the human brain have received extensive coverage in the
popular press with cover stories in The Economist and The New Scientist. There has also been a burst of
discussion in the scientific literature (Farah, 2002; Wolpe, 2003), and a number of professional conferences
have recently focused attention on the field. The current capability of neuroscience to monitor and alter brain
function has profound ethical implications, which scientists and the public have only begun to examine.
Comments
Postprint version. Published in Cardiff Centre on Ethics, Law and Society, September 2003, 4 pages.
Publisher URL: http://www.ccels.cardiff.ac.uk/issue.html
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/bioethics_papers/19
Brain Research and Neuroethics
Martha J. Farah, Brain Research and Neuroethics, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience 
Paul Root Wolpe, Departments of Psychiatry and Sociology and Center for Bioethics 
Arthur L. Caplan, Emanuel & Robert Hart Professor of Bioethics, Chair, Department of 
Medical Ethics and Director Center for Bioethics 
 
 In the past year "neuroethics" has begun to command the attention of neuroscientists, 
ethicists and journalists. Ethical questions associated with new knowledge of the human 
brain have received extensive coverage in the popular press with cover stories in The 
Economist and The New Scientist. There has also been a burst of discussion in the 
scientific literature (Caplan, in press, Caplan & Farah, in press; Farah, 2002; Wolpe, 
2003), and a number of professional conferences have recently focused attention of the 
field. The current capability of neuroscience to monitor and alter brain function has 
profound ethical implications, which scientists and the public have only begun to 
examine.  
New knowledge, new ethical challenges 
Recent progress in neuroscience has been fueled by a combination of methodological and 
theoretical advances. The most obvious factor responsible for the current explosion of 
knowledge is functional neuroimaging. This set of methods, particularly positron 
emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), has 
allowed the observation of patterns of activity throughout the brain as humans engage in 
different mental processes (Aguirre, 2003).  
The introduction of molecular biology techniques into neuroscience has been responsible 
for an equally important revolution in understanding the neurochemistry of thought. The 
past ten years have seen an acceleration in the ability to identify and control, with ever 
more specificity, the molecular mechanisms of human cognition, feeling, and action 
(Barondes, 2003). 
Finally, there have been important theoretical advances in the behavioral sciences. 
Intelligent, motivated behavior results from the interplay of multiple systems for 
cognitive and affective information processing, and it is these systems, rather than the 
observable behavior, that map most directly onto the brain. With the decline of 
behaviorism and the ascendance of cognitive science, models of human information 
processing now exist that provide the needed level of psychological analysis for 
mediating between behavior and the brain. Recent computational and evolutionary 
analyses of human behavior have also informed theorizing about mind-brain relations 
(Gazzaniga, Mangun & Ivry, 2003). 
Enhancement of normal brain function 
An especially controversial ethical issue at the heart of neuroethics is whether and when 
it is ethically permissible for normal healthy individuals to use medical and 
biotechnological means to enhance their mental functioning. While people have always 
tried to enhance their functioning in one way or another through ingestion (alcohol, 
caffeine), new drugs are appearing that greatly increase enhancement potential. On 
college and high school campuses, the illicit use of Ritalin (methyphenidate) is not 
uncommon for purposes of increasing attentional focus when studying (Farah, 2002; 
Wolpe, 2003). Medications that are effective in improving the mood of individuals with 
depression are sometimes also used as “mood brighteners” by nondepressed people 
(Kramer, 1993). New drugs are also appearing that allow persons to go without sleep for 
longer periods of time apparently without as many untoward side-effects as current drugs 
such as caffeine or methamphetamines. 
Several novel drugs for improving memory in dementia are currently in clinical trials, 
and at least some of them appear to enhance the memory of normal healthy subjects 
(Farah, 2002). As our understanding of the neurochemistry of cognition and emotion 
improve further, we can expect newer drugs with ever more specific effects. The 
reduction in side effects will in turn entice greater numbers of people to enhance their 
brain function pharmacologically. 
Methods of neurocognitive enhancement are not restricted to pharmacology, although at 
present the nonpharmacologic methods are too rudimentary for enhancement of function 
in healthy humans. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), used experimentally in the 
treatment of psychiatric disorders, might one day be used to activate or inhibit specific 
cognitive systems for purposes of enhancement. Brain-machine interfaces being 
developed to augment memory and control robot arms might, in the even more distant 
future, enhance the cognition of normal individuals (Hoag, 2003). 
Is enhancement right or wrong? The answer will almost surely depend on the specific 
type of enhancement and population, but certain principles seem to apply to the question 
in the abstract (Farah, 2002; Caplan, in press, Wolpe, 2003). If the benefit to be gained is 
the improvement of normal function rather than the remediation of disease lower levels 
of risk seem appropriate especially where children are involved. If enhancement is not to 
be abused then the prevention of coercion by employers and schools seeking higher 
performing workers and students is essential. Choice must always be obtained before 
enhancement can be undertaken in competent adults.  
In addition, there will be broader social effects of brain-based cognitive enhancement. 
One such effect is the socioeconomic advantage likely to accrue to groups that practice 
enhancement. Policies that promote equal access may prevent the exacerbation of already 
existing inequities in our society. Loss of diversity, stigmatizing the normal or the 
disabled and the commodification of human talent are other potential social effects that 
must be considered. Finally, we must consider the ways in which the fundamental sense 
of self and agency may be altered when and if neurocognitive self-improvement becomes 
commonplace (Wolpe, 2003). 
Neuroimaging of psychological states and traits 
In recent years it has been possible to correlate a surprising number of different 
personality attributes, attitudes, and predilections with patterns of brain activity, 
measured at rest or while performing a task (Canli & Amin, 2003). For example, 
neuroticism and extraversion are associated with distinctive patterns of brain response to 
emotionally pleasant or unpleasant pictures. Attitudes toward individuals of other races 
are associated with patterns of brain response to photographs of same and other-race 
faces. 
Studies, while still rudimentary, have revealed suggestive yet troubling uses for 
neuroimaging. The likelihood that a violent criminal will act violently in the future can be 
estimated based on resting brain scans. Intentional deception results in a different pattern 
of brain activity from truthfulness. These and other examples of potentially sensitive 
information available from brain scans are discussed by Canli and Amin (2003) and 
Farah (2002). It should be emphasized that the correlations between psychological 
variables and brain activity are generally not high enough to make brain scanning a useful 
tool for screening or assessment. However, it is also the case that some individual scans 
may be sufficiently distinctive that they do offer reliable information. But those seeking 
to detect criminal intent or to detain those who may pose a threat to the security of others 
may be willing to utilize information that is imperfect in lieu of anything else. 
Functional brain imaging has the potential to breach the privacy of a person’s own 
thoughts. Privacy is therefore high on the list of ethical issues raised by the new brain 
scanning technologies. Ironically, the more pressing social issue raised by scanning 
concerns its inability to measure mental or neural processing meaningfully. The aura of 
high tech and the impact of visual images may lead judges and juries to put more weight 
on evidence from functional neuroimaging than is warranted. A better public 
understanding of the capabilities of imaging is necessary to prevent an over-reliance on 
this source of information. 
The neurological revolution has not drawn quite the same attention as the revolution in 
genetics in terms of reflection on the ethical and social challenges raised by scientific 
progress. It should. The chances are that changes in our brains to diagnose or enhance our 
behavior will take place in our brains just as quickly as they do in our genes. 
 
References:  
  
Aguirre, G.K. (2003). Functional neuroimaging. In T.E. Feinberg & 
M.J. Farah (Eds.) Behavioral Neurology and Neuropsychology, 2nd edition. 
New York: McGraw Hill. 
Barondes, S. H. (2003). Better than Prozac: Creating the Next Generation 
of Psychiatric Drugs. London, Oxford University Press. 
Canli, T. and Z. Amin (2002). "Neuroimaging of emotion and personality: 
Scientific evidence and ethical considerations." Brain and Cognition. 50:414-431. 
Caplan, AL. M. Farah, “Emerging Ethical Issues in Neurology, Psychiatry and the 
Neurosciences,” In: Molecular and Genetic Basis of Neurology and Psychiatry Disease, 
3rd ed., R.N. Rosenberg, et. al., in press. 
Caplan AL. “Is Better Best?”, Scientific American, 
September, 2003, in press. 
Farah, M. (2002). "Emerging ethical issues in neuroscience." Nature 
Neuroscience 5: 1123-1129. 
Gazzaniga, M.S., Ivry, R. & Mangun, G.R. (2002). Cognitive 
Neuroscience: The Biology of the Mind, 2nd edition. New York: Norton. 
Hoag, H. (2003). Neuroengineering: Remote control. Nature 423, 796 ˆ 
798.  
Kramer, P. D. (1993). Listening to Prozac. Penguin, New York. 
Wolpe, P.R. (2003). Neuroethics of enhancement. Brain and Cognition, 
50, 387-395. 
 
